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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online prob-
lems in which agents arrive over time and truthfully announce their
arrival. These problems are becoming extremely common in a wide
variety of problems involving wireless networking and webserving.
We show how the standard results of mechanism design can be
modiﬁed to apply to this setting, provide conditions under which
efﬁcient and incentive compatible mechanisms exist and analyze
several important online models including wireless networks and
web serving.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Prob-
lem Complexity; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behav-
ioral Sciences—Economics.
General Terms
Algorithms, Economics.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design has along and successful history ineconomics
and has recently become an active area of research in computer sci-
ence[7, 1, 2]. However, most research to date has focused on static
problems, with the notable exceptions related to repeated auctions
[6, 4]. In this paper we focus on online mechanisms in which agents
arrive over time.
This is a classic mechanism design problem with a twist since
all computations and analysis must be done online. Thus, in addi-
tion to trying to infer agents’ valuations, we must also try to infer
agents’ true arrival time, which may not correspond to their an-
nounced arrival time. Intuitively, if the current prices in a system
are high it might be advantageous for a user to delay submitting
their request in the hope that prices might fall.
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Consider the following motivating scenarios:
WiFi at Starbucks: Consider the pricing of WiFi at a cafe
1with
a limited number of connections. Customers arrive would like to
use the WiFi network while enjoying a cup of coffee. What pricing
plan will maximize social welfare (or proﬁt)?
Web serving: Consider the pricing of access to a web server where
page requests have varied service times. In what order should we
serve requests to minimize delay costs?
Ad-hoc Networks: Consider a group of agents who dynamically
create their own network. How should we dynamically conﬁgure
the network to preserve battery life?
In this paper, we willaddress the incentive issues in online mech-
anisms, and seek tobring theannouncement of truthfularrival times
and truthful value information into equilibrium. In particular, we
consider online variations of VCG mechanisms, which reduce the
mechanism design problem into an algorithmic problem.
2. MODEL AND BASIC RESULTS
We introduce a model to capture the problem of online mecha-
nism design. A mechanism deﬁnes a strategy space and a mapping
from agent strategies into outcomes. An outcome
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A social choice function (SCF),
? , deﬁnes a mapping from types
to outcomes, that we wish to implement within the mechanism. An
online mechanism,
@ , is said to implement SCF,
? , if outcome
?
￿
￿
￿
￿
-
￿ is selected by the mechanism in equilibrium, for any joint
types
￿ .
An online direct-revelation mechanism (online DRM) is a mech-
anism in which the strategy space for agent
￿
consists of a single
announcement of a reported value,
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B
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C , at a time,
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￿ , chosen by
the agent. An incentive-compatible online DRM is a mechanism
in which the truthful revelation of value,
"
-
+ , immediately upon ar-
rival, is an equilibrium of the system. In the special case that truth-
revelation is a dominant strategy, an online mechanism is said to be
strategyproof.
A variation of the revelation principle allows us to limit atten-
tion to incentive compatible and direct-revelation online mecha-
￿ Starbucks cafe has recently begun offering wireless access
in their stores with a variety of pricing plans. (See,
http://www.starbucks.com/retail/wireless.asp.)nisms. As with classical mechanism design, this serves to simplify
the mechanism design problem by constraining the design space.
THEOREM 1 (ONLINE REVELATION PRINCIPLE). For both
dominant-strategy and Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, ifa social choice
function can be implemented in an online mechanism, then it can
be implemented in an incentive-compatible online direct-revelation
mechanism.
For the remainder of the paper, we consider the problem of mak-
ing efﬁcient online choices, that maximize the long-term total value
of the system. In particular, we consider the problem of imple-
menting a choice rule
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there payments that make the overall SCF incentive-compatible.
In order to address incentive issues, we consider the family of
Groves [5] mechanisms. In particular, we focus on the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Let
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It is well known that if the choice rule is ofﬂine optimal then the
VCG mechanism is strategy proof. But, perfectly-competitive on-
line algorithms only exist in a few very special cases. (We present
stylized versions of the motivating scenarios in the full length ver-
sion of thispaper [3].) Indeed, there areinformation-theoretic lower-
bounds for many online choice problems. However, all is not lost
and we can ﬁnd weaker conditions for incentive compatibility due
to the physical constraint that agents can’t announce their arrival
before they actually arrive.
We deﬁne an online choice rule,
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in any state of the system. In particular, an agent must not be able
to increase the total value of the system by stalling and reporting
some later arrival time.
THEOREM 2. Anonline VCGmechanism isstrategyproof ifand
only if the online choice rule is time-monotonic.
At this point, it is interesting to highlight a fundamental mis-
match between the worst-case competitive approach of computer
science to online algorithm problems, and what is required here
to get an incentive-compatible online mechanism. It is not sufﬁ-
cient to use an online choice rule with an optimal competitive ratio
(i.e. equal to a lower-bound), because this is not consistent with
the expected-utility maximizing model of a self-interested agent.
Rather, what is required is expected-optimal online choice rules.
Deﬁning expected time-monotonicity in the obvious way, we have
the following main result:
THEOREM 3. Theonline VCGmechanism isBayesian-Nash in-
centive compatible ifthe online choice ruleisexpected time-monotonic.
This is useful, because at least it is clear that expected-optimal
online choice rules, that maximize the average-case long-term efﬁ-
ciency of asystem, always exist(incontrast toperfectly-competitive
online choice rules). Thus, we reduce the online mechanism design
problem to the problem of implementing online choice rules that
maximize expected long-term value.
The VCG mechanism is Bayesian-Nash, but not dominant strat-
egy, incentive-compatible, because the Bayesian optimality of the
online algorithm depends on correct beliefs about the distribution
over agent types, which requires that agents report types truthfully.
3. EXAMPLE
In the full length version of this paper [3] we analyze a spe-
ciﬁc model of the Starbucks problem. Two conclusions that we
draw from that analysis are: (1) Even simple dynamic models can
be computationally intractable. (2) Simple, but suboptimal, proce-
dures can obtain a high percentage of the maximum efﬁciency and
as such might be of practical importance.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the problem of online mechanism design,
and demonstrated how toincorporate online problems into themech-
anism design framework. We adopted the VCG framework, and
showed amapping between perfectly-competitive online choice rules
and expected-optimal online choice rules and Bayesian-Nash in-
centive compatibility. We also highlighted a basic mismatch be-
tween traditional worst-case computer science analysis, and the
expected-utility maximizing models of self-interestedagents within
mechanism design. The most obvious direction for future work
is to construct strategyproof but approximate online mechanisms,
and online choice rules that are time-monotonic for problems in
which there can be no perfectly-competitive rules. We also intend
to adopt paradigms from stochastic dynamic optimization to con-
struct Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible online mechanisms.
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